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Category: geopolitics

  • Countries Reportedly Able to Pass: The Selective Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

    Countries Reportedly Able to Pass: The Selective Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

    As Iran effectively closes the Strait of Hormuz to Western shipping, a select group of nations have reportedly secured passage for their vessels through back-channel negotiations and geopolitical alignment.

    Since March 2, 2026, Iran has enforced a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—the chokepoint through which one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas transits—following retaliatory measures against joint U.S. and Israeli airstrikes that began February 28. While maritime traffic has plummeted by 90-97%, maritime intelligence confirms that Tehran is selectively granting passage to ships from friendly nations, creating a two-tiered shipping regime that favors non-combatant countries aligned with or neutral to Iran’s position.

    The Permitted Nations

    Maritime tracking data reveals that vessels from specific countries are being allowed to transit the strait through a carefully controlled “permission-based” system:China remains the primary beneficiary of Iran’s selective access policy. Multiple vessels including the Stellan and Nora—carrying over two million barrels of crude oil—have successfully navigated the strait, with Chinese-flagged and Chinese-owned vessels receiving priority clearance . Maritime analysts note that vessels bound for China are “more likely to be granted passage” as Iran seeks to maintain economic ties with its key trading partner while exerting pressure on Western economies .India has secured transit rights for its vessels after diplomatic negotiations. At least two Indian-flagged tankers carrying liquefied petroleum gas reached Indian ports over the weekend of March 15-16, following talks between officials. The Indian vessel Nanda Devi was among those documented arriving at Vadinar Port after receiving Iranian authorization .Pakistan has successfully transited the strait, with the Pakistani-flagged oil tanker Karachi—carrying approximately 700,000 barrels of crude oil—crossing through the Larak-Qeshm Channel near the Iranian coast .Turkey has also secured passage for its vessels. Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu confirmed that a Turkish-owned ship crossed the strait with explicit Iranian permission, highlighting Ankara’s diplomatic leverage in the crisis .Greece presents a complex case. While Greek shipping companies operate approximately ten vessels that have recently transited, analysts suggest these may be cases where Iranian authorities verified the cargo and ownership to ensure no links to U.S. or Israeli interests. These vessels appear to transit under strict scrutiny rather than blanket national authorization .

    The Alternative Route

    Ships from permitted nations are not transiting through the main shipping lane. Instead, they are navigating an alternative corridor through Iranian territorial waters, specifically via the Larak-Qeshm Channel opposite the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas . This route forces vessels to “hug the Iranian coastline” before emerging into international waters at the eastern end of the strait—a maneuver that allows Iranian forces to maintain physical control and inspection capabilities over all transiting vessels .Maritime analyst Michelle Wiese Bockmann noted this workaround represents “one of the first signs of permission-based transits to friendly countries,” with vessels broadcasting signals such as “CHINA OWNER_ALL CREW” to identify themselves as eligible for passage .

    The Blockade Strategy

    Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has reportedly established checkpoints where transit vessels undergo inspection to verify they have “no cargo or ownership linked to the United States” . Iranian sources maintain the strait is not officially closed, but that passage is denied to any vessel that could “benefit the aggressors”—referring specifically to the U.S. and Israel .The strategy appears calculated to maximize economic leverage while minimizing military confrontation. By allowing Asian and non-aligned nations to continue receiving energy supplies, Iran maintains crucial economic relationships while driving up insurance premiums and oil prices for Western economies. Brent crude has surged from $72.48 pre-war to highs of $119.50, currently trading above $103 per barrel .

    The Excluded

    The blockade specifically targets vessels with links to the United States, Israel, and their immediate allies. Approximately 1,000 ships remain stranded on either side of the strait awaiting clearance, while Western naval forces face the threat of mine warfare and missile attacks if they attempt to escort vessels through the main channel . Iran has deployed sea mines in the primary shipping lanes—denied by Tehran but confirmed by Washington—and has demonstrated the capability to strike vessels with missiles and drones .

    Geopolitical Implications

    The selective passage system represents a “smart control” strategy that differentiates between states, allowing Iran to exert pressure on its adversaries while rewarding nations that maintain neutral or supportive stances . As Tomas Alexa, senior analyst at maritime intelligence firm Ambrey, explained: “By selectively restricting access rather than completely closing the strait, Iran is signaling that it maintains operational control over the waterway and can differentiate between states” .For the countries reportedly able to pass, the arrangement provides critical energy security and commercial advantage while the global economy absorbs the shock of reduced Gulf oil exports. For Washington and its allies, the situation presents a dilemma: military efforts to reopen the strait could escalate the conflict, while accepting the selective blockade cements a new reality where Iranian authority over the waterway is tacitly acknowledged

  • The Dragon and the Bear in the Persian Gulf: How Russia and China Navigate the US-Israel-Iran War

    The Dragon and the Bear in the Persian Gulf: How Russia and China Navigate the US-Israel-Iran War

    A Geopolitical Assessment of Eurasian Powers in a Fragmenting Middle East

    Introduction: The Shockwaves of Conflict

    When the United States and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran in late February 2026, the strikes reverberated far beyond the Persian Gulf. For Moscow and Beijing—Tehran’s most consequential partners in the multipolar project they have long championed—the conflict presented an immediate strategic calculus that balanced opportunism against existential risk. While both powers publicly condemned the aggression, their responses revealed the limits of their commitment to Tehran and the fragility of the “no limits” partnerships they had cultivated.The war has tested the resilience of the Russia-Iran alliance, strained China’s energy security architecture, and exposed the vulnerabilities of the anti-Western bloc that these powers have sought to construct. Yet it has also offered opportunities: a distracted America, a weakened rules-based order, and potential avenues for diplomatic mediation that could elevate Moscow and Beijing as indispensable regional brokers.

    Russia: Between Opportunism and Exposure

    The Strategic Dilemma

    Moscow’s response to the conflict has been characterized by what Chatham House analysts describe as “strategic hedging”—a posture of sharp rhetorical condemnation coupled with decisive military restraint . The Kremlin has denounced the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as “illegal and immoral” and condemned the operation as an “unprovoked act of armed aggression,” even as Russia launched 106 missiles and drones against Ukraine on the same day .This performative outrage masks a deeper anxiety. Iran represents what Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov once called a “structural node on the southern flank” of Russian influence—a perennial tenet of Moscow’s foreign policy that remains relevant today . Russia has invested decades of capital into Iran’s energy sector, railway infrastructure, and nuclear facilities, including the high-risk venture of constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Moscow has become Tehran’s primary arms supplier, with components of Russian-made drones discovered in attacks across the Arabian Peninsula .Yet the Kremlin has made clear it will not enter military confrontation with the US-Israel coalition. This reveals the fundamental asymmetry of the Russia-Iran partnership: while valuable, it is not worth risking direct conflict with nuclear-armed Western powers or jeopardizing potential negotiations over Ukraine.

    The Opportunity Cost

    For Moscow, the war’s primary utility lies in distraction. The Kremlin hopes that a protracted conflict in the Middle East will divert Washington’s attention from Ukraine, delay any negotiated settlement favorable to Kyiv, and potentially slow the flow of American military assistance . With the US preoccupied elsewhere, Russia anticipates greater freedom of maneuver in its ongoing war against Ukraine.Furthermore, Moscow positions itself as a potential mediator, championing its previously proposed “collective security architecture in the Gulf region” . This allows Russia to maintain relevance even as its material capabilities in the region atrophy following the fall of Assad in Syria.

    The Multipolar Narrative at Risk

    The conflict poses an ideological challenge to Moscow’s grand strategy. Yevgeny Primakov’s 1998 vision of a multipolar world—where powers like Iran, China, and Russia balance American hegemony—faces its most severe test. As CEPA fellow Mathieu Boulègue notes, “If the US and Israel succeed in degrading Iran’s strategic position, the narrative of a resilient multipolar order loses ideological traction” .The Kremlin fears that successful regime change in Tehran would demonstrate that no leader is safe from American policy—a precedent that haunts authoritarian capitals worldwide. Conversely, a weakened but surviving Iranian regime may prove less accommodating to Russian interests, forcing a complete recalculation of Moscow’s southern strategy.

    China: The Calculated Neutral

    Energy Security Under Siege

    China’s response has been defined by strict neutrality—a “balancing act” that prioritizes economic interests over diplomatic solidarity . This caution reflects the devastating immediate impact on Beijing’s energy security. China was importing approximately 1.4 million barrels per day (mbd) from Iran—representing 13% of total crude imports and 80-90% of Tehran’s oil exports—much of it purchased at discounted rates through the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement signed in 2021 .The collapse of Iranian exports has created a 1.0 to 1.4 mbd shortfall for China, hitting particularly hard at the private “teapot” refineries that specialized in processing sanctioned Iranian crude . These refineries, which operated through China’s Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) to circumvent SWIFT and avoid Western financial scrutiny, now face high replacement costs in a market where oil prices hover near $100 per barrel .The closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a critical chokepoint through which roughly 20% of global oil flows—threatens an additional 5.4 mbd of Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Qatar . This represents an existential threat to Chinese economic stability; economic modeling suggests a sustained 25% increase in oil prices could reduce China’s GDP by 0.5% .

    Buffers and Resilience

    Beijing entered the crisis better prepared than most importing nations. China had engaged in aggressive stockpiling in early 2026, with oil imports surging 16% in January and February . Strategic and commercial reserves now total 1.3 to 1.4 billion barrels—covering approximately four months of imports . Pipeline deliveries from Russia have increased by roughly 300,000 barrels daily, though Russian capacity constraints and competing Indian demand (bolstered by a US waiver allowing Indian imports of Russian crude) limit further relief .Domestic production and fallback options like coal provide additional insulation, meaning China “will still be affected, but likely less than many others,” according to energy strategist Tatiana Khanberg . This resilience is reflected in financial markets, where the renminbi has stabilized following initial volatility .

    The Geopolitical Dividend

    China’s neutrality serves a broader strategic purpose. By avoiding entanglement while appearing as a “stable and rational nation compared to the US,” Beijing may accelerate trade realignment toward China as countries seek refuge from American-led chaos . Managing director Ben Cavender notes that China has “very little to lose by staying quiet and a lot to gain by being seen as a neutral party” .This positioning allows China to maintain relationships with all parties—including the Gulf states with whom Beijing has cultivated increasingly close economic ties through initiatives like the China-Gulf Cooperation Council free trade negotiations. The war has disrupted China’s rapidly growing exports to the Middle East—particularly automobiles to the UAE and steel to Saudi Arabia—but Beijing prioritizes long-term positioning over short-term commercial losses .

    Post-War Scenarios: The New Regional Architecture

    The Brokerage Opportunity

    Both Moscow and Beijing are positioning themselves for post-conflict mediation roles. Russia hopes to leverage its relationship with Tehran to secure a place at the negotiating table, potentially reviving its Gulf security architecture proposals. China, with its economic leverage and neutral stance, could emerge as the primary external actor in a reconstructed Iran, particularly if a new government seeks rapid infrastructure reconstruction .

    Strategic Realignment

    A prolonged conflict risks spillover effects—refugee flows, arms proliferation, and militant networks—that threaten Russia’s southern flank and China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects across Central Asia . Both powers face the challenge of managing regional fragmentation while preventing the complete collapse of Iranian state capacity, which could create a vacuum for jihadist organizations or American military bases.Should Tehran emerge significantly weakened but territorially intact, Moscow will likely attempt to deepen military-technical cooperation, providing covert support for regime stabilization while publicly advocating for diplomacy. Beijing, conversely, may pursue a “controlled distancing” strategy, maintaining economic ties while avoiding the reputational risks of association with a pariah state .

    The China Variable

    The war has illuminated a fundamental shift in Eurasian geopolitics: Beijing, not Moscow, possesses the economic instruments to shape post-war Iran. Russia lacks the financial weight to underwrite Iranian reconstruction or stabilize its economy. China holds this capacity—but will deploy it selectively, conditioned on political stability and oil access.This creates an implicit competition between the two nominal allies for influence in Tehran, even as both publicly champion their “no limits” partnership. The war may ultimately accelerate a transition from a Russia-led to a China-led engagement strategy with Iran, reflecting broader shifts in Eurasian power distribution.

    Conclusion: The Limits of Anti-Western Solidarity

    The US-Israel-Iran war has exposed the constraints of the Russia-China-Iran axis. Despite decades of diplomatic coordination, shared hostility to American primacy, and substantial economic interdependence, neither Moscow nor Beijing was willing to risk direct confrontation to prevent Tehran’s degradation. Their responses—opportunistic hedging from Russia, economic self-preservation from China—reveal that the multipolar project remains a coordinating framework rather than a mutual defense pact.For Russia, the war offers temporary relief in Ukraine at the cost of potentially losing its most reliable Middle Eastern partner. For China, the conflict tests energy security resilience while offering a chance to appear as the adult in a room of belligerents. Both powers will survive the crisis, but the notion that they can collectively restrain American military action has suffered a decisive blow.In the emerging regional order, Moscow and Beijing will compete as much as coordinate for influence in a fragmented Middle East, with Iran—whether surviving or transformed—serving as the primary theater for this great power rivalry. The war has not ended the multipolar moment, but it has revealed its boundaries: when the missiles fly, even strategic partners are ultimately on their own.

    Sources:

    CEPA (2026), “Russia, Europe, and the Iran War”

    Chatham House (2026), “The Iran war exposes the limits of Russia’s leverage”

    Defense Priorities (2026), “Beijing’s balancing act in the Iran war”

    Bruegel (2026), “What the war in Iran means for China”

    Euronews (2026), “China treads carefully on energy interests in Iran war”